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ABSTRACT: This article seeks to explore how the idea of tragedy can highlight some of the 
complex and paradoxical aspects of the relationship between ethics and leadership. First, it 
offers a comparative analysis of the way in which questions of leadership are addressed as a 
practical and theoretical concern when leaders are confronted with situations of moral crisis. 
The context is provided by a critical reading of the MBA Oath, a student-led pledge that tries 
to establish a higher moral standard for leaders, and by Norman Bowie’s attempt to develop a 
Kantian theory of leadership. Second, it introduces a novel philosophical approach based 
upon Hegel’s interpretation of tragedy and ethical life developed in his theory of aesthetics. 
Through the idea of tragedy, the concept of ethical leadership could also encompass those 
ambiguous situations when good conflicts with good and when a possible reconciliation of a 
moral conflict might require the sacrifice of otherwise legitimate ends. 
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On September 12, 2008, forty-eight hours before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
leaders of major financial institutions were summoned to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York. Their task was to come up with a plan that would avert a global financial catastrophe. 
According to the New York Times journalist Andrew Sorkin, 
 
By 8:00 a.m. [September 13, 2008], the grand lobby of the New York Federal Reserve was 
teeming with bankers and lawyers. They had gathered not far from a giant bronze statue of 
young Sophocles, his outstretched arm holding a tortoiseshell-and-horn lyre. The statue was a 
symbol of victory after the Battle of Salamis, a clash that saved Greece and perhaps Western 
civilization from the East. On this day the bankers assembled at the Fed had their own historic 
battle to wage, with stakes that were in some ways just as high: They were trying to save 
themselves from their own worst excesses, and, in the process, save Western capitalism from 
financial catastrophe.1 
 
It seems strange that an investigative attempt to describe the events at the height of 
the 2008 financial crisis would be based on an image of a young Sophocles towering above a 
group of banking executives and on a language that makes liberal use of the tragic idiom. 
Perhaps, as is quite customary in popular texts, the author is simply trying to capture the 
imagination of his readers. Nothing sells like a good tragic story. However, a closer reading 
of Sorkin’s entire account reveals that elements of tragedy are being employed not only as 
rhetorical devices but also as a way of foregrounding the character of eminent individuals and 
the ethos embodied in key social institutions. For example, this is how Richard Fuld, the 
CEO of Lehman Brothers at the time, is portrayed as a tragic hero, 
 
He did make errors, to be sure—some out of loyalty, some out of hubris, and even some, 
possibly, out of naiveté. But unlike many of the characters in this drama, whose primary 
motive was clearly to save themselves, Fuld seems to have been driven less by greed than by 
an overpowering desire to preserve the firm he loved. As a former trader whose career was 
filled with any number of near-death experiences and comebacks, he remained confident until 
the end that he could face down this crisis, too.2  
 
Fuld seems to emerge as a tragic character in a drama. A few months earlier, he had 
been named in the Barron’s list of the world’s best CEOs.3 In a sudden reversal of 
circumstances, his actions are no longer those of an exemplary leader but of an individual 
who is motivated by hubris. His destiny does not lie in a distinguished leadership position in 
a global financial institution but points towards a seemingly heroic downfall. Organisations 
also participate in the same tragic entanglement. This is how Sorkin attempts to capture the 
sobering, almost desolate atmosphere inside the courtroom, when the sale of Lehman 
Brothers was being negotiated between the firm’s lawyers and the bankruptcy judge, 
 
Signaling to Harvey Miller of Weil Gotshal, Judge Peck said: “You may approach, if that’s 
what you’re doing. I can’t really tell…” Miller, even under these circumstances dapper in a 
gray suit, red tie, and blue shirt, outlined the deal: Barclays would pay $1.75 billion for 
Lehman’s North American operations. “This is a tragedy, Your Honor,” Miller said of what 
had happened to Lehman Brothers. “And maybe we missed the RTC by a week,” he added, 
referencing the development of the new TARP program. “That’s the real tragedy, Your 
Honor.” “That occurred to me as well,” Judge Peck said sympathetically.4 
 
Sorkin’s use of the tragic idiom is not uncommon. On the contrary, it is indicative of a 
much wider rhetorical trend. Cohan calls his account “a tale of hubris” and refers to one of its 
main characters, the CEO of Bear Stearns, as “a Sophoclean tragic hero, ruined by his own 
terrible choices”.5 Similarly, Tett prefaces her book by referring to “the real tragedy of the 
story”, which “was that most of the folly was not due to a plot; instead, it was hidden in plain 
sight”, or “that so many of those swept up in the lunacy were not acting out of deliberately 
bad motives”.6 Rajan, one of the few economists to publicly forewarn of the impending 
disaster, accuses Greenspan of hubris, while Lewis calls the crisis “a tragedy” generated by 
“the doomsday machine”.7 Finally, Lowenstein identifies certain elements of a symbolic 
ritual in the turn of events, arguing that “Lehman could serve as a catharsis, its bankruptcy a 
purifying fire…”.8 
Attempting to grasp a situation of great ethical complexity, these authors have 
recourse to the language of tragedy. All the elements that constitute its idiom - reversal and 
recognition, tragic flaw and hubris, catastrophe and catharsis - are being invoked in order to 
reveal the depth and gravity of the moral predicament. According to their accounts, the 
sequence of events unfolded in a typical tragic fashion; a dramatic change from a state of 
economic prosperity to a state of adversity that no one was able to foresee. Leaders had to 
confront contradictory moral claims, reflecting the diverse yet interconnected domains of 
business, politics and society as a whole.9 Their virtues were exposed as flaws that led to 
transgression and catastrophe. Leading financial institutions were made to account for 
practices that appeared, in hindsight, as morally illegitimate and as threats to the stability of 
the general political and social order. Ambiguity crept into customary distinctions between 
good and bad, and ethical disorientation emerged as the outcome of various conflicting 
voices attempting to defend their equally legitimate moral positions. Finally, a resolution to 
the crisis seemed almost impossible without the need for some painful sacrifices and for the 
re-establishment of limits. 
Evidently, the narratives referenced here are not constructed as tragedies in the 
technical sense of the term.10 Nor do they claim to offer a particular view on ethical 
leadership. However, they do draw attention to an important connection between the idea of 
tragedy and the ethics of leadership in organisations central to contemporary societies. It is 
this connection, which has received little theoretical attention, that the article will seek to 
explore. The questions that arise are twofold: first, can the idea of tragedy enrich our 
understanding of the relationship between ethics and leadership? and, secondly what is the 
nature of ethical life that the tragic brings into view, which might enhance existing 
approaches to ethical leadership? It is worth mentioning that contemporary studies in 
philosophy, the social sciences, law and literature have provided fertile ground for exploring 
the link between tragedy and ethical life.11 In the field of leadership studies, a tragic 
perspective on ethics occupies a marginal place in spite of the significant and 
multidisciplinary body of scholarly work encompassing both normative and social scientific 
perspectives.12 
Thus, the aim of the article is to explore some of the constitutive elements of the 
tragic in order to gain a deeper understanding of the ethical problems and challenges that 
leaders and followers face in the world of organisations. In other words, the article aims to 
offer a novel philosophical approach through which ethical life manifests as an irreconcilable 
conflict between equally powerful and justifiable moral standpoints. Certain aspects of 
ethical leadership could then be viewed as a dramatic unfolding of organisational lives 
entangled in a collision between contradictory and irreconcilable goods. Further, attempts to 
resolve the conflict would presuppose an inevitable sacrifice of legitimate moral ends; a 
sacrifice that often makes the actuality of ethics for leaders and followers such a painful and 
tormenting experience. 
The article is divided into two interrelated sections. The first section seeks to examine 
how ethics is posited as a practical and theoretical concern when business leaders confront 
critical moral situations. The context is provided by the MBA Oath that tries to establish a 
code of conduct for leaders based on consequentialist principles and by Norman Bowie’s 
attempt to establish a Kantian, that is, a deontological theory of leadership. The section 
concludes by tracing the idea of tragedy in Robert Solomon’s work that alludes to the 
possibility of a tragic encounter with ethics in the world of organisations. The second section 
seeks to expand on Solomon’s insights by developing the main elements of a philosophy of 
the tragic. Its basis is drawn from G.W.F. Hegel’s interpretation of tragedy in his theory of 
aesthetics.13 The conclusion explores the possible horizon that might be offered by an attempt 
to account for the agonising ambiguities of those situations when justifiable ethical actions 
collide and whose resolution is only thinkable through a painful yet humanising recognition 
of ethical limits. 
 
 
RESPONDING TO CRISES OF ETHICAL LEADERSHIP 
 
The moral ramifications of the financial crisis have elicited a response from investigative 
journalists suggesting the possibility of uncovering certain tragic elements in the turn of 
events. A group of MBA graduates from the Harvard Business School also felt that the crisis 
engendered an overwhelming sense of ethical disorientation and ambiguity,  
 
Without a doubt the financial crisis changed our experience at business school. Companies 
once thought to be examples of great achievement suddenly failed. Executives once hailed for 
their business acumen quickly lost their jobs. Financial models once taught as the cutting 
edge in risk management were abruptly shown to be deeply flawed…Suddenly the solid 
ground beneath our feet was giving way…14 
 
In response, they drafted an oath aiming to set a higher moral standard for future 
business leaders. Their attempt attracted considerable attention from the press and rekindled 
the debate about the role of leaders as moral agents in society. An abridged version of it 
reads,  
 
As a manager, my purpose is to serve the greater good by bringing together people and 
resources to create value that no single individual can build alone. Therefore I will seek a 
course that enhances the value my enterprise can create for society over the long-term. I 
recognize my decisions can have far-reaching consequences that affect the well-being of 
individuals inside and outside my enterprise, today and in the future. As I reconcile the 
interests of different constituencies, I will face difficult choices. Therefore I promise: I will 
act with utmost integrity and pursue my work in an ethical manner. I will safeguard the 
interests of my shareholders, coworkers, customers, and the society in which we operate. I 
will manage my enterprise in good faith, guarding against decisions and behavior that 
advance my own narrow ambitions but harm the enterprise and the people it serves. I will 
understand and uphold, both in letter and in spirit, the laws and contracts governing my own 
conduct and that of my enterprise. I will take responsibility for my actions, and I will 
represent the performance and risks of my enterprise accurately and honestly. I will develop 
both myself and other managers under my supervision so that the profession continues to 
grow and contribute to the well-being of society. I will strive to create sustainable economic, 
social, and environmental prosperity worldwide. I will be accountable to my peers and they 
will be accountable to me for living by this oath…15 
 
The oath prescribes a set of core moral principles that ought to regulate the conduct of 
leaders with regard to various stakeholders. As de Bruin argues, it seeks to establish those 
“general rules of conduct that provide oath-takers with a general normative vantage point”.16 
In this case, a normative vantage point is secured by a combination of consequentialist and, to 
a lesser extent, deontological principles.17 The oath requires leaders to reflect on the potential 
consequences of their actions and evaluate how these can affect the interests of different 
constituencies. It approves or disapproves an action based on its utility, that is, its tendency to 
augment or diminish the well-being of the constituencies whose interests are in question.18 If 
an ethical reconciliation is to be achieved then a leader ought to be able to perform this moral 
calculus. The hope is that by signing the oath, individuals will commit to more ethical 
behaviours. It would also be an important step towards rebuilding the trust between business 
and the wider social body, which is often cynical or even hostile towards business as a moral 
principle. Thus, the oath could act as a code of conduct that would overcome all the moral 
imperfections that the crisis had brought to the fore and that had dealt such a severe blow to 
the prestige of future business leaders. 
In terms of the argument developed in the article, the MBA oath illustrates how 
questions of ethical leadership are being translated into concrete action when leaders confront 
critical moral situations. The instinctive reaction is to reach for a normative code of conduct, 
which is invested with the hope of guaranteeing the stability and order of the ethical domain. 
In other words, ethics is translated into a technical problem that has a possible solution. The 
solution lies in the application of a moral calculus that will alleviate some of the 
contradictions and ambiguities inherent in ethical life. Most important, the figure of the 
leader is constituted in terms of his or her power to take command and control every domain 
of moral action: from safeguarding the interests of shareholders, co-workers and customers, 
to creating sustainable prosperity and well-being for the economy, the society and the 
environment. He or she becomes the focal point of moral reconciliation and harmonisation. 
Thus, the contradictory ethical demands stemming from such conflicting and ambiguous 
spheres of human endeavour (e.g. on the one hand, profit generation, self-interested 
acquisitiveness, corporate growth, and on the other, global sustainable development, 
environmental protection, social and economic equality) could be reconciled and be made to 
reach a state of equilibrium as long as every potential leader wills it. Leadership itself is 
thought of as a principle that can secure their destiny, since both past and future are invoked, 
and it is made to act as a moral power able to establish, estimate and align their true value. 
 The MBA oath provides a useful illustration of a practical response to questions of 
ethical leadership that is based upon utilitarian principles. From a deontological perspective, 
the thinking of Norman Bowie has provided an additional normative framework aiming to 
address the philosophical ground of the relationship between ethics and leadership.19 His 
work has also inspired a type of analysis seeking to demonstrate not only that certain 
financial practices leading to the crisis were inconsistent with “Kantian capitalism 
principles”, but had these principles been applied, the crisis itself would have been averted.20 
According to Bowie, minimising the possibility of moral crises requires individuals or 
organisations morally bound by the three formulations of Kant’s categorical imperative, 
 
1. Act only on maxims that you can will to be universal laws of nature. 
2. Always treat the humanity in a person as an end, and never merely as a means. 
3. So act as if you were a member of an ideal kingdom in which you were both subject and 
sovereign at the same time.21 
 
Adherence to, or deviation from them becomes the criterion for judging moral or 
immoral business conduct. They also provide the possibility of establishing a set of duties 
that ought to guide the conduct of business as a whole. Bowie then proceeds to develop “a 
Kantian theory of leadership”, which stipulates that a leader ought not to violate the three 
formulations outlined above.22 Leaders ought to respect the dignity and autonomy of their 
followers, who as rational human beings, are to be treated as an end and never as a means. 
The aim is to allow followers to become leaders themselves.23 The same principle applies to a 
leader considering the role of various stakeholders; they should never be treated as a means 
for achieving the aims set by the shareholders. Also, such a theory should highlight the 
importance of participation and should acknowledge and respect the voice of organisational 
minorities. The organisation itself is to be viewed as a community bound by rules that every 
rational individual should accept freely and without coercion. Against a hierarchical, elitist or 
instrumental view of leadership, Bowie’s vision is that of egalitarianism, where values such 
as dignity, respect and individual autonomy provide the basis for moral conduct.24 He then 
concludes by formulating the general principles that ought to guide a moral leader, 
 
The following principles may guide a leader as he or she attempts to transform an 
organization into a kingdom of ends: 
1 The leader should consider the interests of all the affected stakeholders in any decision he 
makes. 
2 The leader should have those affected by the firm’s rules and policies participate in the 
determination of those rules and policies before they are implemented. 
3 It should not be the case that the leader always gives the interests of one stakeholder group 
priority.  
4 When a situation arises where it appears that the humanity of one set of stakeholders must 
be sacrificed for the humanity of another set of stakeholders, the leader cannot make a 
decision on the grounds that there is a greater number of people in one stakeholder group than 
on another. 
5 Every leader must in cooperation with others in the organization establish procedures to 
ensure that relations among stakeholders are governed by rules of justice.25 
 
Despite some important conceptual differences that set the MBA oath and Bowie’s 
theory apart, a more careful analysis might reveal certain elective affinities that point to a 
shared understanding of the relationship between ethics and leadership. The first is indicated 
by an attempt to configure this relationship through the establishment or adoption of a moral 
principle (e.g. utility or the categorical imperative) that would act as a standard and measure 
for distinguishing between good and bad, right and wrong. The meaning of a principle has to 
be secured against any form of internal ambiguity and contradiction. It should not lead to an 
ethical oxymoron26 or an insoluble paradox and the moral knowledge produced by it should 
be free from vagueness or confusion. On the contrary, a principle ought to provide a firm 
conceptual basis for an understanding of leadership ethics as a balanced and stable order, 
which can be captured through clearly delimited and differentiated moral categories. 
The second affinity refers to a binary opposition, afforded by a principle, between the 
moral categories of the good and the bad or moral and immoral. In both cases, the ethical 
aspects of leadership are identified and examined when these are grounded in a moral 
dichotomy. The ethical appears in the antagonism of good and bad, or as Lewis put it in an 
earlier study, “the rightness or wrongness of behaviour, what is morally right or wrong, 
ethical or unethical.”27 Actions, decisions and forms of practice ought to be placed on one 
side or other of a fixed system of moral references. A binary opposition also makes possible 
the framing and fixing of abstract conceptions into clear mechanisms for the resolution of 
ethical transgressions through ideal norms towards which every leader and business 
organisation ought to aspire to in their practices. The ethical appears as a deviation from 
norms, which requires further enforcement through increased regulation in various regions of 
practice. Resolving the bad becomes a matter of superimposing abstracted ideals crystallised 
in norms upon the actual practices constituting the conduct of leadership. By focussing on the 
apposition good/bad or moral/immoral, ethics is delimited to singular moments of 
transgression of the good by the bad, when their opposition is highly visible through the 
scandalous and an ethical deviation from the accepted norms is evident and clear-cut.28 
The third aspect of this manner of thinking is the telos of the proposed solutions. Both 
frameworks envisage a possible state of ethical purity in the domain of leadership if their 
precepts are applied. Aiming to minimise the possibility of transgression, they seek to 
accomplish a more harmonious relationship between individuals and organisations. This ideal 
state, which is rooted in a form of humanistic optimism, is expressed in truly utopian terms,  
 
a universal morality of business, provid[ing] meaningful work for employees, institut[ing] 
firms as moral communities, and help[ing] establish a more cosmopolitan and peaceful world, 
Kantian capitalism shows everything a theory of business ethics could do… This claim 
maybe incredibly optimistic, but then again so were Kant and the other Enlightenment 
thinkers.29 
 
Adherence to a framework would guide a leader to a place where the struggle 
between the good and the bad will be resolved. This utopia, Bowie calls “Kantian capitalism” 
and it expresses a genuine anticipation of a realisable future.30 As a concept, it points to a 
possible reconciliation of the contradictory and conflictual aspects of ethics. In other words, 
what these efforts have in common is a vision of leadership that would be freed from the 
paradoxical and ambiguous nature of ethical life. The solution lies in the application of a 
corrective model that would guarantee and safeguard the (re-)production of the good for the 
wider social body. 
Finally, there is a fourth common characteristic that is identified by Robert Solomon 
in his attempt to reflect on the nature of normative ethics, 
 
There is a further complication…and that is the possibility of a clash of contexts, a conflict of 
duties… Some of the pressure for very general principles that apply to all situations both in 
and out of business comes from the desire to deny the possibility of such conflicts (which in 
extreme cases are called “tragedy”).31 
 
In this brief passage, Solomon suggests that a normative understanding of ethical life 
may stem from the desire to deny the possibility of tragic conflict. He argues, however, that 
“one of the most obvious discoveries of any empirically minded or practical virtue ethics is 
that there is often a conflict of virtues, a clash of loyalties, a disharmony of equally valued 
values.”32 Inspired by Unamuno’s ‘Tragic Sense of Life’33, Solomon is able to express what 
goes at the very heart of the idea of tragedy, namely, that ethics also includes those critical 
situations when equally legitimate moral claims or “equally valued values” conflict with each 
other. He then attempts to exemplify his insight into the nature of ethical life by referring to a 
few possible organisational scenarios where 
 
one’s duty to superiors may well conflict with one’s obligations to subordinates, and in any 
but the best-organized company there is always the possibility of conflicting, even 
contradictory but equally obliging orders from two different superiors. One’s sense of loyalty 
to an aging and no longer effective manager who provided one’s job opportunity in the first 
place may well clash with a more general sense of obligation to the company.34 
 
It is rather unfortunate that a more comprehensive analysis was reserved for the theme 
of spirituality rather than for business or leadership ethics.35 However, if the ethical aspects 
of leadership are to be considered in their full complexity, the idea of tragedy should be 
further developed. Accordingly, instead of denying the possibility of such conflicts the 
following section will examine how the ethical might present itself precisely as a collision 
between equally justifiable and interdependent moral standpoints. 
 
HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF THE TRAGIC AND ITS RELATION TO ETHICAL LIFE 
  
Tragedy as a philosophical perspective re-enters modern thinking through the 
representatives of German Idealism at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth centuries. It is a central theme for its three main figures: Schelling, Hölderlin, and 
Hegel.  The return, so to speak, of tragedy marks a thoroughly methodical understanding of 
the historical novelty of the modern age, as well as a conceptual recovery of a way of 
thinking that had become marginal to early modern philosophy with its search for a 
grounding of ethics in systems of reason and rationality. These three figures were followed 
by others – Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche being principal heirs of the 
problematic of tragedy for the modern epoch.36 
Yet it was Hegel who made the interpretation of tragedy a central element for 
understanding ethics beyond the abstract rationalism of the philosophy of his day. Hegel’s 
attempts to understand the reality of human existence in its entire complexity and 
contradictory nature, made tragedy a predominant mode of framing his inquiries regarding 
ethics. His works relied upon tragedy from their inception: from the writings on natural law 
in 1802–1803, to the Phenomenology of the Spirit in 1807, and then on to the late works of 
his mature thinking, especially in the two volumes on Aesthetics covering an extended period 
from 1823 to 1829. Throughout his thinking, his understanding of the dialectic of ethical life 
is based upon the dialectic of the tragic.37 The Aesthetics, however, offer an image of Hegel’s 
conception of the tragic and ethical life in one of its most developed expressions. 
 In the Aesthetics, Hegel argues that the core content of tragic conflict is provided by 
the substantive ethical powers that lay claim to the human will and its actions. State and 
country, family and kinship, friendship, and love are some of these powers that manifest in 
individual characters, animating their passions and giving form and substance to their aims 
and fate. Innermost to the essence of tragedy is their movement when they actualise and 
particularise in individuals. Before being summoned into the world of human affairs, that is, 
when they become the concrete object of an individual’s passion, these different powers exist 
in harmony and concord. They are the constitutive, complementary and inactive parts of that 
concrete unity which Hegel calls the ‘ethical order.’ However, when they enter the world of 
action, that is, the mundane, earthbound world of human activity, they have to sacrifice their 
tranquil and undisturbed union, their sublime repose, and split into opposing and conflicting 
sides. In the worldly domain, their difference becomes an opposition and a collision. For 
example, the ordinances of the state might oppose and collide with the custom of familial 
duty and obligation, the abstract universality of law might oppose and collide with an 
individual’s right for self-determination, or the law of the gods might demand what the law of 
nature forbids. It is this rupture of the ethical order that constitutes for Hegel a tragic moral 
crisis,  
 
if this essential object of human feeling and activity is to appear dramatically, it must come 
on the scene separated into different and opposed ends, so that the action has to encounter 
hindrances from other agents and fall into complications and oppositions where both sides 
struggle for success and control.38 
 
However, the opposition that Hegel identifies is not based upon a distinction between 
good and bad, right and wrong. On the contrary, a tragic conflict erupts when the ethical 
powers and the individuals who identify with them have an equal share and an equal claim to 
moral legitimacy. In this view, tragedy becomes a conflict between good and good, and tragic 
opposition arises when the conflicting sides are equally justified in the pursuit of their moral 
ends. That is why, in Hegel’s view, the conflict is insoluble and the opposition of goods 
irreconcilable. As he argues, 
 
The original essence of tragedy consists then in the fact that, within such a conflict, each of 
the opposite sides, if taken by itself, has justification; while each can establish the true and 
positive content of its own aim and character only by denying and infringing the equally 
justified power of the other. The consequence is that in its moral life, and because of it, each 
is nevertheless involved in guilt. 39 
 
For Hegel, at the heart of a tragic understanding of ethical life lies an opposition 
between equally justified ethical powers. Put simply, tragedy is an irreconcilable conflict 
between goods. It captures the ambiguity and paradox inherent in those critical situations 
when good conflicts with good. This insight into the nature of ethical life, afforded by a 
Hegelian reading of tragedy, problematises the normative understanding of ethical leadership, 
which manifests as a dichotomy between the moral categories of the good and the bad, moral 
and immoral. 
Leaders often find themselves entangled in a tragic paradox. Their experience of 
ethics can also take the form of an opposition between goods. Their choice to act on behalf of 
a just principle can oppose the equally just principle upheld by other agents in the 
organisation. Of course, this opposition can extend beyond strict organisational boundaries to 
include diverse social collectives, i.e. various stakeholders. Its tragic nature though remains 
conflictual and contradictory. In order for a leader to accomplish a legitimate ethical end, he 
or she would have to deny and infringe upon someone else’s equally valid position. A 
conflict between ethical positions that are justified and yet, at the same time, wrong because 
they refuse to recognize each other’s validity is the main paradox that defines the tragic sense 
of ethical life. By defending one good, a leader or follower may be forced to violate an other. 
As a result, he or she can be both innocent and guilty. In this sense, individuals, leaders or 
followers, can be morally worthy and flawed at the same time, since they act from the good 
but also against it. This tragic paradox often makes ethical leadership a painful and 
tormenting experience. 
Against this backdrop, Hegel also argues that a tragic character “must be a man of 
worth and goodness himself”.40 For ethics to unfold in a tragic manner, the conflict of 
characters must stem from their commitment towards the good, which means that a moral 
crisis can occur without the intervention of a malevolent agent responsible for a wrongdoing 
or for transgressing a moral law. On the contrary, “the occasion for collision is produced by 
the moral justification of a specific act, and not at all by an evil will, a crime, or infamy, or by 
mere misfortune, blindness and the like.”41 
In a crisis of conflicting goods, the binary characterisations of individuals, leaders or 
followers, as ethical or unethical, moral or immoral, good or bad cannot be sustained. On the 
contrary, a tragic crisis presupposes an individual’s steadfast dedication to a just cause, which 
can lead to suffering and to a moral crisis. It could be possible then to consider moral crises 
in organisational lives that might not be the result of leaders or followers acting in an 
immoral or unethical way. Rather, it is their “worth and goodness” that could lead to an 
moral crisis. This tragic paradox can be explained in the following way. In order for the 
conflicting parties to defend and accomplish their aim, they have to pursue it one-sidedly and 
thus deny the equal validity of someone else’s claim.  They have to assert the legitimacy of 
their position with an intransigence that cannot be appeased. Arising from the dignity of their 
cause, it forces them to an act of hubris, in other words, it forces them to exceed their bounds. 
However, a tragic flaw should not be interpreted as a condemning judgement against 
individuals but as a recognition of their paradoxical position. Critical situations may impose 
upon leaders to act out of moral necessity and if they do, they are bound to confront a moral 
crisis. It is this particular complication of human conflict and suffering that gives ethics its 
tragic quality. Hegel emphasises that, “in considering all these tragic conflicts we must above 
all reject the false idea that they have anything to do with guilt or innocence. The tragic 
heroes are just as much innocent as guilty.”42 
The commitment to defend what is right means that tragic characters emerge as fully 
responsible and accountable for their actions. For Hegel, individuals come to be constituted 
as authors of their own actions, as well as agents of the powers that shape and justify their 
moral resolve. He suggests that tragic action itself presupposes the unfettered resolution 
towards a legitimate moral aim and a willingness to accept freely the responsibility for those 
actions and consequences that might lead to suffering and to a moral catastrophe. 
Accordingly, 
 
“[t]he individual identifies himself with their realization [of the ethical powers] and in it finds 
his own will and his own satisfaction, and now with his whole being must take responsibility 
for what the issue is in the external world.  The individual dramatic character himself picks 
the fruit of his own deeds.”43 
 
Individuals who freely accept their own fate and eventual downfall, who are neither 
villains nor victims, alongside an irresolvable conflict between ethical powers of equal 
strength and legitimacy, constitute in Hegel’s account some of the principal elements of the 
tragic unfolding of ethical life.  
The final element this section seeks to explore relates to the nature of the ‘tragic 
denouement’. Hegel conceives of tragedy as an irreversible movement towards a final 
catastrophe. The reason for such a dramatic resolution is attributed to the one-sidedness of the 
conflicting powers and individual characters. This means that each of the conflicting parties 
enters the scene seeking to secure exclusive control within a moral conflict by denying and 
infringing upon the equally valid claim of the opposing side. But when it comes to a tragic 
conclusion this one-sided, exclusive claim to validity is stamped out by the irresolvable 
nature of the conflict. In other words, individuals face their own destruction because of their 
one-sidedness, or they face the sacrifice of their own position and the acceptance of what 
they had opposed, 
 
Therefore what is superseded in the tragic denouement is only the one-sided particular which 
had not been able to adapt itself to this harmony, and now (and this is the tragic thing in its 
action), unable to renounce itself and its intention, finds itself condemned to total destruction, 
or, at the very least, forced to abandon, if it can, the accomplishment of its aim.44 
 
As a result, the collision between justifiable moral ends culminates in the downfall of 
one of the opposing sides. The concept of the tragic does not allow for a resolution where 
conflicting moral standpoints can be accommodated and reconciled. A tragic conclusion 
requires that one of the moral ends reaches its utmost limit and collapses. In relation to the 
search for a business utopia, where irreconcilable ends are forced to become harmonious, a 
tragic conclusion is based upon a painful realisation of the impossibility of moral 
reconciliation and harmonisation. The admission of human limits and of the limits of moral 
ideals has an important additional feature. Tragic recognition is rooted in the full awareness 
of the ethical predicament facing the characters and not in a moment of ignorance regarding a 
supposed best path to moral excellence. As Hegel posits, in this moment of recognition of the 
irreconcilability of the conflict of goods, individuals realise that they are driven “back within 
[their] limits and destroyed by them if these are crossed.”45 In the end, the conflicting parties 
would “have to taste the bitter wine of a sense of finitude and to fight their way through 
difficulty, loss and sacrifice.”46 Suffering, pain and sacrifice are often the unacknowledged 
but inescapable features of the complex relationship between ethics and leadership. In a 
tragic resolution of conflicting goods, neither the good nor the bad can claim moral success. 
The good does not triumph over the bad or vice versa. Quoting a line from Schiller’s poem 
“Shakespeare’s Shadow”, Hegel writes that, 
 
we should not interpret such a conclusion as a purely moral outcome where evil is punished 
and virtue rewarded, i.e. ‘when vice vomits, virtue sits at table’.47 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has attempted to problematise some of the binary oppositions that 
underlie certain normative approaches to ethical leadership and to challenge their vision of a 
possible ethical reconciliation and harmony in the business domain. It has sought to blur the 
boundaries between well-established moral categories, such as good and bad, moral and 
immoral, right and wrong, allowing ambiguity and paradox to come to the fore as equally 
important features of the conduct of leadership. Also, it has tried to highlight the fluidity and 
precariousness of these customary distinctions when leaders or followers are confronted with 
tragic moral situations. It was thus argued that through the idea of tragedy ethics can also 
appear as an irreconcilable conflict between equally justifiable moral ends; a conflict that 
often makes ethical leadership such a painful and incalculable experience. Most important, 
the tragic has spoken of a truth about the ethical conduct of leadership that is not disclosed 
through the abstract universality of reason or calculation but through the lived experience of 
pain and suffering. 
One of the more insightful and pertinent summaries of the tragic condition can be 
found in Max Weber’s text with regard to science as a vocation, which echoes Hegel’s 
analysis. Addressing students at Munich University, who like the MBA graduates were also 
concerned about their own profession, he argued, 
 
This proposition, which I present here, always takes its point of departure from the 
one fundamental fact, that so long as life remains immanent and is interpreted in its 
own terms, it knows only of an unceasing struggle of these gods [and ‘moral’ forces] 
with one another. Or speaking directly, the ultimately possible attitudes toward life 
are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion. 
Thus it is necessary to make a decisive choice.48 
 
Against this background, the contribution of the tragic idea can be made more visible 
in the context of the important moral dilemmas captured by the future generations of leaders 
in their MBA Oath. Claims to growth, to a sustainable future and to an equitable 
redistribution of wealth are equally justifiable; however, brought together by the urgency of 
the times, they collide in such a way that the prospect of a final resolution might require the 
painful sacrifice of one or other of these moral ends. These moral concerns mark concretely, 
everyday systems of decision making, policy, and governance without lending themselves to 
normative formulations that present the good in unequivocal contradistinction from the bad.  
However, the concept of the tragic does not constitute a pessimistic outlook. Rather, it may 
explain the apparent difficulty of arriving at a position in which all moral demands on 
ourselves, our institutions, and the world could be reconciled without a painful recognition of 
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